For the American technical community, these exchanges provided opportunities to bring Chinese talent back into world science, get access to distinctive natural and social phenomena and data, and learn of pockets of Chinese research excellence. But, more generally, they led to an appreciation of the great costs to Chinese science and higher education imposed by the Cultural Revolution years. For the Chinese technical community, the opportunities to travel to US facilities was a liberating chance to reestablish contact with international science, but also provided a new perspective on just how far behind China had fallen after years of radical politics.
For the two governments, the S&T relationship was an opportunity to build closer political tiesin spite of a highly asymmetrical nature of scientific development in the two countries -to counter Soviet influence. Six months prior to the January 1979 formal establishment of diplomatic ties, and on the heels of Zbigniew Brzezinski's important visit to China in May, 1978 , which helped lay the political foundation for normalization, President Carter's science adviser, Dr. Frank Press, led a major delegation of representatives from US technical agencies to
China to explore the expansion of relations in science and technology. This was then followed by the signing of agreements in the fall of 1978 for cooperation and exchange in agriculture, space, energy, earth sciences, and hydropower, and the important Agreement on the Exchange of Students and Scholars which opened the way for the 1 million plus Chinese who subsequently came to the US for training and advanced degrees. For the US, the S&T relationship was one more strand in the "web of relationships" it hoped to build with China, one that addressed both many of China's developmental concerns and US long-term interests in global issues. For the Chinese, the relationship offered invaluable access to intellectual resources needed to rebuild the research and higher education systems. Scientific, technological, and political factors were thus mixed together in what was an interesting new initiative in Cold War science diplomacy, and one that facilitated the reestablishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries.
Few would have imagined what the Agreement would have wrought 30 years later. The web of relationships that has been created in S&T is now characterized by multiple institutional strands, with multiple stakeholders having multiple objectives. Although the reforms and investments made in China's research institutes and universities have not entirely erased the asymmetries of the past, they have certainly made China an especially important partner in research and innovation for many constituencies in the US. In a number of fields of research, and on a number of pressing global problems, the S&T partnership between the United States and China will play a critical role in determining how the 21 st -century future is invented. Revolutions in sciencebased technologies hold the potential for significant enhancements in national wealth and power in both countries, while shared interests in the management of such collective goods and bads as pollution, water and energy availability, food supplies and a broad range of issues involving risk and safety focus increased attention on knowledge-based approaches to these challenges.
The Drivers of Change.
In considering what has changed in the relationship over the course of 30 years, several factors stand out.
Geopolitical Realities. As noted above, Sino-American rapprochement in the 1970s was driven largely by shared concerns about Soviet power and its use. A concrete expression of these shared concerns was the Brzezinski visit to Beijing in May of 1978, which immediately preceded the Press delegation in July. The significance of the concerns about the Soviet Union was also evident during the 1980s when a Republican administration took power and gradually overcame its predispositions towards Taiwan to expand the science and technology relationship with the mainland, including importantly the relaxation of export control policies. Geopolitical realities, in short, were the ultimate justification for an expanding S&T relationship characterized by a growing number of Chinese science and engineering students coming to the United States, an expansion of government S&T programs, as well as liberalized export controls.
The events of 1989, of course, altered the geopolitical assumptions in fundamental ways. The collapse of the Soviet Union, the promises of democratization in the former Soviet empire, and the image altering events at Tiananment on June 4th combined to shake the political foundations of the S&T relationship. Following June 4th, government to government programs were suspended, high-level contacts between officials were cut, the US academic community expressed its outrage at the crackdown of the Tiananmen demonstrations, immigration regulations for Chinese students in the United States were relaxed, and embargoes were placed on technology transfer. The S&T Agreement was allowed to lapse and scheduled meetings of the JCM were not held. Nevertheless, some exchanges did continue and lower-level contacts between officials were maintained. Thus, in spite of the souring of political relations wrought by the Tiananmen events, the S&T relations survived and some observers would credit them for serving as an especially enduring element in Sino-US relations, even when the political relationship becomes deeply troubled. In April, 1991, the Agreement was renewed for another In spite of the jolts to Sino US relations resulting from the Belgrade bombing of the Chinese Embassy at the end of the Clinton administration, and the EP3 incident at the beginning of the Bush administration, the attack on the World Trade Center and the subsequent initiation of the "global war on terrorism" again changed the geopolitical situation in ways which strengthened US-China ties. Indeed, most observers of US foreign policy during the Bush years would argue that the US China relationship was the one bright spot of Bush foreign policy. In spite of the existence of serious trade problems, the Bush administration ended with a generally unambiguous endorsement of engagement, rather than containment, with China being treated increasingly as the "responsible stakeholder" called for by Robert Zoellick. The initiation of the Strategic Economic Dialogue (SED) and the exploration of new opportunities for military to military relations came to define new possibilities for a political foundation for S&T relations.
The inclusion of energy, environmental, and technological innovation concerns in the agenda of the SED also pointed to the growing importance of science and technology for the two countries and a maturation of the S&T relationship itself.
On the occasion of the 30 th anniversary of normalization and of the signing of the S&T Agreement, the Obama administration thus begins in a radically transformed geopolitical context from the one that gave rise to the Agreement at the outset. 
Changes in Science and Technology. Changes in science and technology have also been drivers
for change in the Sino-US S&T relationship. These can be understood both in terms of intellectual content, or substance, and in the social relations of science and technology. When the Agreement was signed 30 years ago, the revolutions in computer science and information technology were only beginning. Molecular biology and biotechnology, likewise, were relatively immature as was modern materials science. Nanotechnology was largely a conceptual enterprise.
Since then, of course, there has been remarkable progress in all these fields and with it the creation of new science-based industries. China, for the most part, was not a player in any of these fields at that time, but has now become highly active. The revolution in instrumentation through the application of ICT which was beginning 30 years ago, and about which China knew little, has now transformed the research environment and reinforces trends towards interdisciplinarity.
30 years ago personal computing was only just beginning and there was no Internet. Universityindustry relations were nowhere near the intensity they are today, and intellectual property claims instance, has declined, and the health of its research enterprise depends increasingly on foreignborn scientists and engineers, many of whom are from China. Thus, over the course of 30 years,
we again see that the Sino-US S&T relationship has moved from one of manifest asymmetry to a far more complex pattern of interdependency.
Global Problems. Growing interdependency is also evident in a fourth driver -the rise of a series of global problems which have substantial technical content and in which China and the US have particular interests. These, of course, include climate change and environmental protection, energy, water quality and availability, and epidemics and infectious diseases. They also include terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, information security and other national security related issues, and issues pertaining to the operation of the global economy such as the nature of international regimes for technical standards and intellectual property. These issues have all become considerably more pressing than they were 30 years ago due, in part, to China's economic growth and development. China and the US are both very sensitive to the ways in which these problems affect them and they clearly have special responsibilities for solving, or at least ameliorating, them. Most obviously, as the world's two leading consumers of energy and producers of greenhouse gases, the ways in which the two countries approach these issues have global implications. At the same time, they provide opportunities for -some might argue, they demand -intensified bilateral cooperation and coordinated leadership in multilateral settings.
But while the stakes are rising, questions about the modalities of relationships in science and technology are also becoming more complex. Research and innovation today is frequently characterized by the shortening of time between scientific discovery and technological application. Scientific research is therefore seldom far from commercial application and from the emergence of dual use technologies having both commercial and military applications. Concerns among business enterprises, universities, and governments for protecting proprietary knowledge, or knowledge of relevance to national security, have been heightened. Thus, the win-win, positive sum assumptions about cooperation in science have become complicated by the fact that the development of commercial and national security applications of new knowledge often introduce competitive pressures and the possibility of zero sum outcomes. National governments continue to adopt policies designed to capture value from scientific and technological advances and enhance national capabilities for research and innovation, even as they expand international cooperation. Both China and the United States exhibit these tensions -between "science and technology nationalism" and "science and technology globalism" -and the relationship between them is an especially rich case of how these tensions are managed.
Current Activities.
It useful to categorize the current relationship according to the main institutional channels through which it is conducted. These include government agencies, academic and professional channels, and corporations. 8 The existence of these channels, developed over the past 30 years, represents significant institutional resources for the kinds of strategic partnering on 21 st -century scientific and technological development and global problems alluded to above. These challenges have basic research components, commercial components, and public goods components requiring a repertoire of organizational approaches, many of which now exist.
Government Programs.
The government to government relationship, conducted under the Agreement and some 26 subordinate agency to agency protocols (themselves having more than 60 annexes), covers a broad range of activities from basic research to technical assistance in domains ranging from agriculture to transportation. The implementation of the Agreement is the responsibility of the Joint Commission on S&T Cooperation (JCM), which meets roughly every two years and is co- The Framework provides for intensified cooperation in areas of electric power generation, transportation, clean water, clean air, wetland preservation. The recently completed Fifth SED added energy efficiency to the framework and enlists the US Trade and Development Agency and the US Export-Import Bank to support private sector activities in addressing "deficiencies in energy efficiency Chinese enterprises" and to assist in the implementation of the clean water program. TDA funding will also be used to support training programs for government officials at the national and provincial levels in pollution reduction and energy efficiency. With China joining ITER (International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor), opportunities for bilateral cooperation on multilateral issues have also increased. In both the high-energy physics and nuclear fusion cases, we see that China's increasing ability and willingness to pay for large complex and expensive facilities is one of the reasons why it has become an increasingly attractive partner for international cooperation. 
Industry.
Cooperation through industrial channels began in the early 1980s with the transfer of technology.
The initial forms of transfer involved licensing and equipment purchases, but as China's foreign investment regime came to be liberalized during the course of the 1980s, technology transfer increasingly became part of foreign investment projects. By the 1990s, China had developed increasingly sophisticated foreign investment regulations intended to extract as much technology as possible from foreign investors under its so-called "market for technology" strategy. Although US firms were not alone in transferring technology to China, in terms of scale and value of investments, levels of technology, and styles of corporate management, US companies arguably have been the major source of foreign technology for China since the early 1980s, in spite of US export control policies.
China's accession to WTO, has required that its foreign investment regime be liberalized, thus undercutting to some extent the policy tools used in the "market for technology" approach. It is in this context, of course, that China has redoubled its support for its own industrial R&D and made the development of its own technical standards and intellectual property central objectives of its MLP (Medium to Long-Term Plan). Interestingly, however, as China began to adjust its own industrial and technology policies in anticipation of WTO membership, foreign companies began to show an interest in performing R&D in China, thus facilitating new forms of knowledge transfer.
Interest in investing in R&D in China began slowly in the early 1990s, mainly with the initiation of contracts for research and technical services from Chinese universities and research institutes.
Gradually, however, R&D activities were added to corporate investment strategies, and by the end of the 1990s, a number of companies had established R&D centers in China. By the end of 2007, this number had risen to some 1,160, the majority of which were American firms. It is thought that R&D expenditures by companies accounts for at least 15% of China's industrial R&D, and perhaps as much as 30%. Although a great deal of this R&D activity goes to support manufacturing and marketing in China, for a number of large firms -IBM, Microsoft, General Electric, etc. -China R&D operations have become critical components of global technology development efforts and have led to important basic and applied breakthroughs.
There is considerable debate about the impacts of these operations. On the Chinese side, government policy has been welcoming of these efforts in the belief that they provide China with critical experience in the management of R&D in the kinds of science-based industries China sees as the future of its industrial economy, and will lead to significant knowledge transfers as employees migrate out of the MNCs to start their own companies or join Chinese enterprises.
Nevertheless, there are also critics who argue that most of the benefits from these R&D centers go to the MNCs, and their global operations. The benefits for China do not compensate for the costs in terms of the loss of some of China's best and brightest to employment in MNCs and in terms of policy privileges granted by the Chinese government, in this view.
Similarly, on the US side, critics argue that China-based R&D centers lead to technological leakage which will come back to haunt American companies, and result in the loss in highpaying professional jobs for American scientists and engineers. Defenders of R&D investments in China argue that US companies are forced to globalize their R&D in order to stay competitive, especially with regard to exploiting pools of science and engineering talent wherever it may be.
In both the Chinese and US debates, we again see the playing out of tensions between science and technology nationalism in science and technology globalism.
Academic and Professional Contacts.
At the core of developments in Sino-US collaboration are the thousands of activities occurring at the scientist to scientist level. This, of course, is consistent with the traditional culture of academic science, as researchers seek out colleagues with common interests with whom they can share findings, collaborate or, perhaps, compete. Collaboration among individuals in China and the US, of course, has been powerfully influenced by the ties that have developed as a result of 
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Chinese students doing graduate work at US universities. Mentor-student relations involve research collaboration which over time evolves into senior colleague-junior colleague collaboration.
A high percentage of Chinese students who have come to the US over the 30 years have stayed and taken professional employment in US universities, companies and government laboratories.
14 At the same time, these individuals have often maintained ties with colleagues at institutions in China which has also fostered collaboration. Thus, there is also a strong co-ethnic dimension to Sino-US relations in S&T as well. The effects of both the US graduate school experience and the influence of common ethnicity is evident in co-authoring patterns of China-and US-based researchers. When one examines the international co-authoring of China-based researchers, collaborations with US colleagues clearly outnumber those with other countries. 15 Reportedly, nearly 40% of China's science and engineering publications in international journals had USbased co-authors. On the US side, some 8% had China-based co-authors. 16 Among China-US coauthored papers, the role of co-ethnicity is quite high. 17 While it may be premature to discuss the emergence of "Chimerican" science, 18 it is nevertheless evident that a deepening interdependency in academic science is developing between the two countries. S&T exchanges expanded during the 1970s, China could begin to appreciate how "unmodern" it had become relative to the dynamic capitalist world from which it had been cut off, and began to realize that its scientific and technological development would require profound changes in both its domestic institutions and foreign relations.
The US offered an alternative vision of science and modernity which became iconic for many
Chinese in the post-Mao period. And yet, a deep-seated ambivalence about the US, grounded in assessments of the differences in Chinese conditions as well as in Chinese political and cultural nationalism, precludes any unqualified embrace of the American model. Chinese elites have therefore sought to guide China's reform experience by studying institutions and policies in a number of countries, and then attempting to reconcile them with Chinese realities. Yet, the US experience has gotten the most attention by virtue of US superpower status, its international leadership position in science and technology, US dominance as a destination for Chinese students and scholars, and the fact that as a large continental country, it faced many governance challenges of relevance to China in ways that other countries providing lessons to China didn't.
This somewhat contradictory set of attitudes towards the US provides both opportunities and challenges for the relationship. On one hand, there is a reservoir of positive expectations in China about the US and about what China can learn from the US. On the other hand, there is great sensitivity to Chinese pride and national identity which can readily lead to negative feelings about United States the US superiority complex manifests itself and leads to condescension towards China, and when the US itself fails to live up to the promise inherent in its institutions and wealth. Here, let us focus here on the opportunities.
These derive from the fact that China's problems of governance become more complex even as its capabilities in science and technology grow. The rapid expansion in Chinese expenditures on research and development over the past decade, for instance, has raised a whole series of questions about the effectiveness of funding mechanisms for promoting good science, the maintenance of the integrity of those mechanisms, and the means for ensuring accountability to political authority for expenditures. As spending has increased, increasing amounts of money are flowing not only to MOST, and it system of national projects, but also to the NDRC and other ministries charged with implementing the objectives of the MLP. However, the mechanisms for macro controls and accountability are not well developed with a result that bureaucratic machinations may trump national policy intent, and make possible corrupt practices which threaten both bureaucratic integrity and the integrity of science itself.
Governance issues are also evident in questions as to how science comes to serve government missions in the provision of public goods, a topic of increasing importance in China's changing policy priorities. Although Chinese government agencies charged with providing public goods have their own research facilities, China's institutional legacy is one in which the best science is usually done in the Chinese Academy of Sciences and universities, i.e. in institutions that are bureaucratically separate from users and service providers. The user agencies, on the other hand, have not in general had strong traditions of cutting edge research, focusing their scientific activities mainly on more immediate delivery of services; the CMA focuses on how to better predict weather, rather than on atmospheric physics even though fundamental research on Finally, governance issues are evident in the realm of what might be called "regulatory science."
As China's environmental and industrial safety problems illustrate, the development of regulatory capacity has clearly lagged behind the technological change which has accompanied China's economic development. While many of the problems of the regulatory regime have to do with law and enforcement, modern regulatory policy also requires high-quality scientific capabilities to assess risks and to set standards.
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In short, there are critical areas where science and governance intersect in the modern polity. As the discussion above illustrates, there are a series of issues of increasing importance for China where this intersection is troubled. China's experience with the reform of its science and technology system over the past 30 years has focused on building scientific and technological capacity and overcoming obstacles to commercial exploitation of knowledge -what might be called science and technology for development. 24 Considerably less attention has been given to these governance issues with the result that modernization is incomplete and further reforms are Administration in China, to the role that the FAA has played in promoting airline safety, etc.
As China struggles with its science and governance issues resulting from increasing expenditures on science and technology, it will have to consider whether there are other aspects of the US model to be emulated. These would include questions having to do with high-level science advice, stronger legislative oversight, mechanisms for tighter budget controls and the integration of budgeting and macro management, and sectoral questions about the roles which companies, universities, an academy of sciences and a ministry of science and technology should play in a modernized China. Since so much of the strengths of the US research and innovation systems is based on universities and private corporations, and multi-agency university research portfolios made possible by pluralistic funding sources, those Chinese who take inspiration from the US model would see China's science and technology future in strengthened university and enterprise R&D, and strengthened R&D capabilities in mission agencies. But, the relative weaknesses of the university, corporate and mission agency sectors in China argues, in the view of others, for central roles for government leadership for industrial research (through MOST and NDRC), and the maintenance of a strong and capable Chinese Academy of Sciences.
The Changing Politics of Cooperation.
From the discussion above, we can see that there have been vast changes in the bilateral S&T relationship over the past 30 years. We can discern a growing interdependency between the two countries as 21 st -century realities bring the issues of S&T cooperation closer to their vital national interests. As we have seen, however, cooperation in science and technology is viewed on both sides as carrying risks as well a substantial benefits. To enhance the chances that the benefits will be realized, and to minimize the risks, the two countries will have to steer through a number of issues which have affected cooperation in the past. These include the following:
Finding Common Understandings on Security Issues. Although security issues have not precluded active programs of collaboration, they have often been irritants and in recent years have become more problematic. A central issue that has affected the relationship since 1979 has been US export controls which, although liberalized over the course of the past 30 years, nevertheless still elicit complaints from China and from many American exporters. More 25 The most recent case coming to the author's attention was the inability of MIT educated Academician Chen Hesheng, director of the CAS Institute of High Energy Physics to obtain a visa in time to attend a professional meeting in Washington in November, 2008. 26 Available at www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=12567. 27 troubling is the growing concern over "deemed exports,"and the implications that policy in this area have for the movement of persons and for the administrative burdens placed upon institutions -universities, corporations, government laboratories -hosting Chinese students and scholars. Post-9/11, security driven immigration policies, as noted above, have also been a problem. Although progress has been made in the visa granting process for students coming to the United States, delays in granting visas continue to frustrate scientific communication and often prompt organizers of scientific meetings to convene meetings outside of the United States in order to avoid cumbersome and often demeaning visa problems. 25 The recently released report from the National Academy of Sciences, Beyond "Fortress America," though not explicitly focused on China, calls for a major overhaul of US approaches to export controls and visas for professionals, and offers the Obama administration an agenda of choices of relevance to the relationship with China. 26 On the Chinese side, restrictions on the sharing of data for security reasons has been a problem, especially in NOAA's relations with the SOA.
In several areas, national security considerations have precluded cooperation. Space has been a prominent example as have communication and cooperation in defense related areas, although the time may be right or movement in these. From a US point of view, progress towards better understanding on security issues is also closely related to problems of Chinese espionage.
Although it is unlikely that S&T related espionage will be thoroughly purged from the relationship, there is a need for China to better understand that reports of Chinese espionage in the United States sours the relationship and enhances the position of constituencies in the United
States who would radically reduce professional contacts with China.
Funding. The funding of S&T cooperation with China has also long been an issue. Policy is weak. For a limited number of high priority areas, such as energy and environment, the SED mechanism has brought greater coordination and national coherence to both countries, but it is still too early to tell whether these are sustainable in the face of a new administration. There are those on the US side who would argue that more high-level attention to the relationship inevitably makes for greater political visibility and, perhaps, political vulnerability.
Nevertheless, in both countries the research and innovation enterprises are huge and increasingly differentiated. Both countries therefore need fora at which the views of multiple stakeholders in the S&T relationship can be represented.
Doubts have also been raised about the adequacy of the JCM mechanism. First, given the growing importance of the relationship, some have suggested that a meeting every other year does not provide sufficient opportunity for high-level exchange of views and the development of plans; the meeting should therefore occur annually, in this view. 27 Others would argue that the JCM mechanism deals only with activities occurring under the Agreement and subordinate protocols, whereas S&T relations between the two countries, as seen above, are now multichanneled, involving multiple stakeholders, both public and private. In this view, there is a need for a broader, more inclusive mechanism for guiding the relationship that would reflect academic, industrial, as well as governmental interests. Finally, some have wondered whether the SED mechanism, at least for energy and environment, was superseding the S&T relationship under the Agreement. As the Obama administration develops its policies towards China, it has an opportunity to propose innovative set of arrangements which more fully reflect the growing importance of science and technology in China US relations.
Managing the Contradictions of Globalization. As suggested above, concerns over capturing the benefits of the knowledge economy have prompted governments around the world to support policies to advance national competitiveness through the promotion of innovation. At the same time, international cooperation in science and technological development has been growing, leading some to speak in terms of the globalization of research and innovation. China and the United States have both responded to these developments with a mixture of scientific and technological cosmopolitanism and economic or techno-nationalism. In recent years, China has clearly become concerned about its dependency on MNCs for commercial technology and a clear objective of its new MLP is more effectively to secure its technological sovereignty. The approaches it has used to do so, as seen for instance in some of its efforts to promote its own technology standards, reflect a troubling techno-nationalism. In the US, despite its strong At the outset, the relationship of the late 1970s was described as a new departure in Cold War science diplomacy in which both the scientific and political values were at play. Scientific and political values are no less at play in the relationship today, but the formula for integrating them has clearly changed as the world has changed. Cold War concerns no longer drive the relationship, the distribution of scientific and technological capabilities around the world has changed, and science-based technologies affecting competitiveness and national security are never far from political agendas in ways that were not true 30 years ago. Science diplomacy still involves negotiation and mutual adjustment among nation states; in our case, between an established scientific superpower and a rising one. But, it also involves the development of strategies for managing multiple interactions in a world of internationalized research and innovation networks. Hence, while the concept of "Chimerican" science has appeal, it is ultimately misleading precisely because of the multiple interactions both China and the US have with other countries in the networks.
In these networks, the US can still be thought of as a "supernode," whose science and technology assets attract collaborators from around the world. But, while this status in the networks continues, it also faces challenges from other nodes of activity -"emerging supernodes" if you will -whose status is being enhanced by virtue of successful collaboration with other active nodes and by successfully exploiting network externalities. China clearly qualifies as an emerging supernode which has not only build up its domestic science and technology assets by its own ambitious policy and investment decisions, but has also shrewdly devised strategies for international cooperation to exploit network effects. Within the networks, though, its bilateral relationship with US remains by far the most important.
For the US, the bilateral relationship with China 30 years ago was of little significance for the well being of its science and technology. This is no longer the case; and trends suggest that cooperation with China will become increasingly important for the health of the US science enterprise and for maintaining its network position. While understood by many in the business, academic, and government technical communities, this insight has not been widely recognized by the political community in the US, but this is beginning to change.
Thirty years of cooperative relations between the two countries leave both in good positions to exploit these S&T ties to enhance their positions as "supernode" and "rising supernode" in global research and innovation networks. Enhanced cooperation between them will have the effects not only of strengthening the networks, but will also help determine how 21 st -century global problems will be approached and how 21 st -century technological future is to be invented.
